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India is an outstanding case for the study of 
multiculturalism. It is home to policies of legal 
pluralism in religious family law (Hindu, Muslim, 
Christian, Parsi), territorial autonomy for several 
linguistic and tribal groups, as well as quotas in 
legislatures, government jobs and educational 
institutions for caste and tribal minorities. Scholars 
have hailed the Indian Constitution of 1950 as a 
prescient model of multicultural accommodation for 
its recognition of a range of group-differentiated 
rights within a broadly liberal democratic framework. 
Predating Western multicultural policies by several 
decades, the Indian Constitution poses a challenge 
to the influential view that multiculturalism in Asia 
and Africa is a recent export from the West. As the 
work of scholars of Asia has shown (eg. Hefner 
2001), non-Western experience of dealing with the 
challenges of ethno-religious pluralism is longer-
standing than that of most Western democracies.  
 
While India’s experience is undoubtedly significant 
for theories of multiculturalism, I argue that claims of 
Indian exceptionalism need to be qualified. Drawing 
upon my book Debating Difference, Group Rights 
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and Liberal Democracy in India (2011), I show that several constraints that 
hindered the adoption of multicultural policies in other contexts can be 
observed in India as well. These include the association of minority 
protections with colonial divide and rule, the influence of developmentalist 
ideologies that deny the significance of ethno-cultural claims, and the 
convergence of liberal concerns for individual rights with nationalist concerns 
regarding civic unity and social cohesion. Relative to the late colonial state, 
the Indian Constitution marked a cutback in multicultural provisions, a moment 
of containment in the long career of group rights in India. It inaugurated a shift 
from consociationalism to affirmative action as the overarching framework of 
group-differentiated rights. 
 
The Indian Constitution embodies two distinct approaches to the 
accommodation of difference that might roughly be termed integrationist and 
restricted multicultural. It is true that in advance of many Western 
democracies notably the US, the Indian Constitution recognizes affirmative 
action (known as reservations) for historically disadvantaged groups. 
Nevertheless, as I show in Debating Difference, in India’s constitutional vision, 
a normative deficit remained with regard to the protection of cultural difference 
and minority practices. As a basis for group-differentiated rights, cultural 
difference, unlike ‘backwardness’, lacked adequate normative support in 
India’s constitutional vision. The normative deficit at India’s founding moment 
continues to be politically influential. State assistance to minority cultures has 
been seen as an illegitimate concession motivated by electoral 
considerations, a line of critique exploited skilfully by a resurgent Hindu right.  
 
Does this suggest that a liberal framework inherently lacks the normative-
ideological resources required for the accommodation of group-differentiated 
rights, as postcolonial theorists have often suggested (eg. Chatterjee 1998)? I 
challenge this influential view in Debating Difference, detailing how in Indian 
policy debates, considerations of secularism, equal citizenship and equality of 
opportunity have been construed, often appropriately, as consistent with 
group-based rights. Nor do my findings lend support to the anti-modernist 
position that the modern state is incapable of accommodating difference in 
any real sense, and that we should rely instead on societal practices of lived 
religion and everyday toleration (eg Nandy 1998). Rather, in India, as in many 
other countries, the main challenge for multiculturalism has been the failure of 
policy-makers to elaborate normative-ideological resources for the justification 
of multicultural rights, mostly on account of an overly narrow understanding of 
the requirements of national unity. The long shadow of the country’s partition 
along religious lines in 1947 continues to limit political imagination with regard 
to the accommodation of difference.  
 
II. The minority question in the Indian Constituent Assembly 
When the minority question came before the Constituent Assembly in 1946, it 
had already had a controversial career of more than half a century behind it. 
Group-based representation had been the hall-mark of colonial 
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constitutionalism, with each step of constitutional reform in the first half of the 
twentieth century accompanied by the extension of special representation 
provisions to more groups - Muslims, Sikhs, Indian Christians Anglo-Indians, 
Depressed Classes as they were then known (Scheduled Castes or ex 
Untouchables). Mechanisms such as separate electorates, reserved seats, 
weightage (guaranteed representation for minorities in excess of their 
enumerated demographic share), nomination, and various combinations of 
these provisions were used. In the decades preceding the transfer of power, 
the ‘minority question’ came to be regarded as the main problem holding up 
progress towards Indian independence. 
 
At the start of the Assembly’s deliberations, the minorities question was 
regarded as encompassing the claims of three kinds of groups: religious 
minorities, Scheduled Castes, and so called ‘backward’ tribes, for all of whom 
safeguards in some form had been instituted by the British and by Princely 
States from the late nineteenth century. All representatives claiming special 
provisions for a group sought to emphasize that the group concerned was a 
minority of some kind. For instance, advocates of special representation for 
Dalits sought to establish that the Untouchables were not a religious, or a 
racial minority but a political minority. The employment of the term ‘minority’ 
did not denote the numerical status of the group so much as the claim that it 
was entitled to special treatment from the state.  
 
In official categorization Untouchables were removed from the purview of the 
term minority. An amendment was adopted, defining the term ‘minority’ more 
narrowly to exclude the Scheduled Castes from its ambit, as well as to deem 
them as part of the Hindu community (KM Munshi CAD V: 227). This move 
reflected both nationalist antipathy to the appellation ‘minority’ and a desire to 
restrict its usage, as well as an anxiety about the separation of the 
Untouchables from the Hindu community that, it was feared their 
categorization as minorities would encourage. Whether Untouchables ought 
to be distinguished from the Hindu community for purposes of representation 
had been a sensitive point for nationalists in the decades preceding 
independence, with Ambedkar and Gandhi emblematic of the adversarial 
positions in this debate. 
 
By the close of the Constituent Assembly debates in 1949, the term 
‘backward’ had become the favoured designation to denote a group’s 
entitlement to special treatment. Representatives favouring quotas for 
religious minorities now sought to establish that there were ‘backward’ 
peoples among Muslims, Christians, Sikhs. This decline in the fortunes of the 
term ‘minority’ during constitution-making encapsulated the transformation 
that the regime of group-differentiated rights underwent from 
consociationalism to affirmative action during its passage from colonial to 
independent India.  
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Approaches to group-differentiated rights in the Indian Constituent 
Assembly 
 
So does the Indian case represent a sacrifice of minority rights at the altar of 
the nation at the moment of independence, as in many other post-colonial 
contexts? Debating Difference offers a more complex story. I argue that three 
broad positions on group rights can be distinguished in the Constituent 
Assembly debates: opposition to all group-differentiated rights, which 
encompassed assimilationist and integrationist positions (these were distinct); 
support for maximal group rights, which can be termed multinational; and an 
intermediate, restricted multicultural position of support for some group rights. 
The classification is heuristic: individuals and parties moved from one position 
to another over time and across issue areas. 1  
 
For instance, initially, minority parties such as the Muslim League, the Akalis, 
and the Scheduled Caste Federation, favoured multinational policies; by the 
end, most had moved to restricted multicultural policies. Constitutional 
outcomes varied across the different areas of group-differentiated rights. On 
quotas (termed ‘political safeguards’ or ‘reservations’) for religious minorities 
as well as ex Untouchables and tribals (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes in official usage) in legislatures and government employment, the 
integrationist position won. On the cultural rights of religious minorities 
(including religious family laws), and territorial autonomy for linguistic 
minorities and tribal populations, a restricted multicultural position was 
embodied in the constitution. Both the integrationist and restricted 
multicultural positions represented a cutback on the multinational provisions 
that had characterised colonial constitutionalism and minority demands 
(although importantly, both were also distinct from the assimilationist positions 
espoused by Hindu nationalists in the Constituent Assembly).  
 
I show that the normative repertoire of Indian nationalism comprised 
conceptions of secularism, equal citizenship rights, democracy, social justice, 
development and national unity. There were multiple meanings of these 
concepts in different strands of opinion in the Assembly that are detailed in my 
book. National unity, the over-riding concern, could stand for political integrity, 
and/or social cohesion, and/or national identity. Secularism in turn for many, 
for some denoted equal citizenship for all individuals irrespective of religion, 
and for others, meant religious freedom for groups, conceptions that 
sometimes collided (eg. in debates on religious family law). However, 
nationalists of different ideological hues, Hindu sympathisers on the right as 
much as staunch secularists on the left (these included minority 
representatives) converged on the view that quotas for religious minorities 
detracted from national unity and also from secularism, justice and 
democracy. By contrast, this convergence was less evident in the case of 
quotas for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, as well as provisions for 
religious, linguistic and cultural autonomy, where secularists and Hindu 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Some of the most vocal supporters of the integrationist position were from 
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sympathisers often spoke in different voices, and group rights were 
maintained in the Constitution.  
 
Integrationist approach: Quotas for religious minorities, disadvantaged 
castes and tribes 
 
The integrationist approach is most evident in the debates on reservations for 
religious minorities, ex-Untouchable and tribal groups. Reserved seats for 
religious minorities had been accepted in 1947, and were included the first 
draft of the constitution of 1948. Nevertheless, nationalists sought to 
emphasise this was as ‘temporary’ provisions and as measures of 
‘compromise’ or transition - in an ideal future, legislative quotas for religious 
minorities would no longer exist (eg. S Radhakrishnan, CAD V: 283-4). 
Reservations for religious minorities were seen as simultaneously violating the 
separation of religion and state and as divisive of the nation. These required 
the recognition of a person's religion or caste in matters of public policy, and 
treated individuals differently depending on the community to which they 
belonged, which it was argued would undermine secularism. These were 
seen as detracting from democracy as these implied departures from the 
principle of the representation of individuals through territorial constituencies. 
But the overriding apprehension in this period was that the granting of special 
representation to religious minorities would undermine national unity. Several 
national-unity concerns coalesced here - the ‘mixing of religion and politics’ in 
the case of separate electorates was thought to have hardened differences 
between Hindus and Muslims, and resulted in the bloody break-up of the 
country. National identity was another concern –quotas were instituted for 
groups defined in terms of the ascriptive criteria of religion, caste, and tribe, 
whereas the dominant conception of national identity in mid 20th century India, 
was civic rather than ethno-cultural, defined in terms of citizenship in a secular 
liberal democratic state. And for some religion, caste, and other ethno-cultural 
affiliations were ‘backward’, pre-modern relics, inconsistent with the task of 
building a modern nation state.  
 
The convergence of liberal and nationalist concerns meant that Hindu 
nationalists often used the language of secularism, equal rights, democracy in 
the Constituent Assembly. It also meant that secularist advocates of minority 
rights were uncomfortable with mechanisms such as quotas that they saw as 
institutionalizing ethno-cultural groups. For instance, when legislative quotas 
for religious minorities were eventually withdrawn in 1949, Nehru commended 
their abolition as ‘a historic turn in our destiny’, confessing that he had never 
been convinced about them, and that ‘doing away with this reservation 
business… shows that we are really sincere about this business of having a 
secular democracy’ (CAD VIII: 329, 332). 2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 It is important not to overstate the overlap between nationalists on the left 
and the right, as several scholars have been tempted to do. Convergence is 
not identity: secular and Hindu nationalists differed on several questions of 
minority rights in the Constituent Assembly.  
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Reservations in the case of ex-Untouchables and tribals by contrast were 
easier to accommodate within a liberal nationalist framework. It was argued 
that these would enable the economic and social advancement of these 
groups that was desirable from the standpoint of the goals of social justice, 
national unity and development. In the case of national unity, the assumption 
was that vertical levelling would produce horizontal integration, that the 
reduction of economic disparities would also reduce social division. In the 
case of national development, ‘catching up’ with the industrialized Western 
world was the desired goal; quotas and other special provisions were needed 
for some time for those sections of the population ‘whose present 
backwardness is only a hindrance to the rapid development of the country…’ 
(KT Shah, CAD VII: 655). 
 
While liberal nationalist and developmentalist ideals offered resources for the 
accommodation of special representation provisions for Scheduled Castes 
and Tribes, it is important to note that these supported quotas as temporary 
affirmative action provisions, and not as a multicultural right. In other words, 
nationalists rejected quotas as a means of recognising social identity or 
protecting the distinct interests for all groups: special representation 
provisions were not intended as permanent instruments of self-government for 
any group. The case for special treatment of Untouchables and tribals was 
constantly distinguished from that of religious minorities through an emphasis 
on their poverty and ‘backwardness’. Recast as a form of  “political’ affirmative 
action” (Kymlicka 1995: 141), as short-term mechanisms (Galanter 1984; 
Mahajan 1998) that would enable the realisation of a future state of affairs in 
which special representation would no longer be necessary, legislative quotas 
for Dalits and Adivasis were not intended to serve as a form of representation 
as such, as I discuss in detail in my book. And while other constitutional 
provisions in the case of the Scheduled Tribes did include an element of self-
government, insofar as legislative quotas were concerned, these were 
advocated as an integrative mechanism. Dr Ambedkar, acute as always about 
institutional effects, saw reserved seats for tribal groups as counter-balancing 
‘the tendency towards segregation’ (Shiva Rao 1968: 587). 
 
Restricted multicultural approach: Religious freedom, family law 
A second approach to the accommodation of diversity in the Indian 
Constitution might be termed restricted multicultural. This approach is 
discernable in the provisions for religious freedom and family laws, as well as 
the rights of linguistic and tribal groups; I shall focus here on the former.  
 
Indian constitution-makers adopted a wide definition of religious freedom for 
individuals and groups. Unlike many other secular constitutions, the Indian 
constitution allows associational and institutional autonomy, and includes 
specific provisions for the public profession of religious identity. Under 
religious freedom provisions in the Indian Constitution, all individuals have the 
freedom to ‘profess, practice and propagate’ religion (Article 25), every 
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religious group or denomination, has the right to ‘establish and maintain 
institutions for religious and charitable purposes’, to ‘manage its own affairs in 
matters of religion’, to own, acquire and administer property ‘in accordance 
with law’ (Articles 25, 26 of the Indian Constitution). The wording of these 
rights in many cases assumed forms that were in keeping with the concerns 
of minority representatives. So a broad definition of the right to freedom of 
religion was adopted after extensive debate, which included the right to 
practice religion in public spaces, and even more controversially, the right to 
‘propagate’ religion. The latter was vehemently opposed by Hindu opinion in 
the Constituent Assembly, but was in keeping with the demands of Christian 
representatives who argued that propagation was fundamental to the 
Christian faith. Religious denominations were permitted by right to hold 
property, and after extensive debate, the state was allowed to aid educational 
institutions that imparted religious instruction (including minority institutions), 
over-riding the objections of those seeking to restrict the domain of religion 
(Shiva Rao 1967 II). There are other instances that I document in Debating 
Difference. Institutional pluralism is notably evident in the retention of 
separate religious family laws for Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Parsis. The 
demands of secularists for a uniform civil code to supplant the different 
religious laws that governed matters such as marriage, divorce in colonial 
India, were rejected. 
 
Nevertheless, the religious freedom of groups is not unconstrained under the 
Indian constitution. The right to freedom of religion is subject to other 
constitutional rights including those of equality and non-discrimination. State 
intervention is permitted not just in the interests of public order, morality and 
health as common elsewhere, but also for purposes of social welfare and 
reform, something of a departure from the colonial state’s stance of non-
intervention in the religious affairs of its subjects. Despite previous promises 
that religious family laws would be protected by specific constitutional 
provisions, no guarantees protecting religious laws from state intervention 
were included in the Constitution; the demands put forward by some Muslim 
representatives for explicit constitutional guarantees were rejected. The Indian 
Constitution includes in its non-justiciable Directive Principles a provision for a 
uniform civil code, opening the door for legal unification in the future. 
 
A restricted multicultural approach, of the kind found in Indian constitutional 
provisions on family law, is not a bad approach for the accommodation of 
diversity within a liberal democratic framework. Many scholars have argued 
that it is preferable to strong or maximal multiculturalism. From a normative 
standpoint, as Kymlicka and others argue, weak multiculturalism offers better 
protections for individuals and vulnerable groups within minorities, in 
particular, women (Shachar 1998). In the case of the Indian Constitution, the 
problem was not with the approach adopted for the accommodation of 
diversity, but with the normative resources for restricted multiculturalism, 
which remained deficient.  
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The normative deficit of restricted multiculturalism 
 
Support was available for limited multiculturalism within strands of Indian 
nationalism. Thus, in a departure from the standard liberal position, groups 
were recognized as subjects of rights and entitlements, as well as individuals 
(see also Mahajan 1998; Bhargava 2000). Speeches frequently emphasised 
for instance, that individuals and groups should have the freedom to pursue 
their religion and develop their language and culture. Equality and justice 
were seen to require religious and cultural freedoms for all groups, including 
minorities; justice, it was said, demanded that no individual or group be 
subject to compulsion in matters of religion or language. Although secularism 
was construed as incompatible with legislative quotas for religious minorities, 
it was also seen to require religious and cultural freedom for all groups 
including minorities. In most connotations of secularism in nationalist 
discourse (on different meanings, see Bajpai 2002), the pursuit of religion and 
the preservation of language and culture on the part of citizens of all 
communities were held to be legitimate goals; their pursuit by citizens in their 
individual and associational capacity, was regarded as a corollary of the 
exclusion of religion from the political domain.  
 
Nevertheless, and in contrast with arguments for affirmative action type of 
group-differentiated provisions discussed above, justifications for multicultural 
provisions remained under-developed in nationalist opinion, on account of 
multiple factors. Prominent among these was the emphasis on individual over 
group rights in this period (see eg. GB Pant, CAD II: 332). It is important to 
note that liberal individualist and developmentalist ideologies gained 
enormously from their convergence with nationalist concerns. The emphasis 
on the individual over the group, and on equal citizenship rights construed as 
the same rights for individuals from all groups provided a means for welding 
together a people divided by their group membership into a nation. It also 
provided the basis for a common national identity in a situation in which ethnic 
criteria were divisive: as noted earlier, India’s national identity was articulated 
in the Assembly in largely in civic terms, as consisting in citizenship of a state 
where the group membership of individuals was irrelevant from the standpoint 
of their rights. Given its links with national unity, it is unsurprising that a liberal 
language was espoused in the Constituent Assembly by a wide range of 
nationalists of diverse ideological moorings, Hindu traditionalists as much as 
Westernized socialists. In my talk, I focussed on how liberal and nationalist 
concerns converged in debates on Muslim family law, so that secularism was 
construed in nationalist opinion largely in terms of equal citizenship rights for 
individuals. While rights to religious freedom of groups were recognised, 
these, it was held, had subordinate status and would be restricted to the 
extent that these conflicted with rights to equality of individuals.  
 
The normative deficit of restricted multiculturalism derived not just from the 
primacy of individual rights and equal citizenship in this period, but also 
because special provisions for the protection of minority cultures remained 
under- supported in nationalist opinion. The move from all groups having 
rights to pursue their culture, to the differential rights of minorities, remained 
www.bu.edu/cura	  	   9	  
unarticulated in nationalist opinion. In the case of ‘backwardness’, I show in 
Debating Difference that the tensions between individual and group based 
claims were confronted and arguments fashioned for special treatment of 
historically disadvantaged groups in terms of nationalist goals. By contrast, it 
is hard to find any elaboration in nationalist opinion on how the protection of 
minority cultures formed part of their vision of the common good. Unlike in the 
case of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, there were no attempts 
to go beyond formal symmetrical notions of equality to substantive, contextual 
notions that could justify the differential treatment of cultures. There were, for 
instance, no arguments along the lines that minorities faced a greater to the 
integrity of their religion, language, or culture than the majority, whose 
practices are inevitably supported by society and the state (eg. Kymlicka 
1995). I trace this process in some detail in the context of the drafting of 
minority provisions, articles 29 and 30, showing how the cultural rights of 
minorities were interpreted largely as negative liberties. While minorities were 
free to pursue their culture at their own initiative, and the Constitution left open 
the possibility of state aid, such assistance was regarded as a concession that 
went beyond the requirements of the right, rather than a duty required for its 
fulfilment: the duties that these required of the state were limited to 
forbearance from interference (on the general point, see eg. Shue 1980). 
 
I have so far suggested that there was a normative deficit in nationalist 
opinion with regard to special provisions for minority cultures, focussing on the 
case of religious minorities. I now want to take the argument a step further, 
and suggest that the normative deficit in nationalist discourse with regard to 
the protection of cultural difference is also observable in the case of other 
minorities, notably tribal groups. It is true, as scholars have noted, that there 
was some acknowledgement in nationalist opinion of a distinctive cultural 
identity (Galanter 1984, Mahajan 1998), of the value of tribal ways of life, and 
the need for the protection of tribal land. Nevertheless, this was qualified in 
important respects in part on account of the influence of developmentalist and 
liberal nationalist concerns. First, as a developmentalist perspective 
dominated discussions, progressive change in Adivasi cultures in the direction 
of greater integration with mainstream society was not ruled out. Provisions 
instead sought to give Adivasi communities greater control over the pace and 
nature of cultural change. As such, even protectionist policies such as those 
for tribal lands did not wholly pursue cultural preservation. Second, and 
relatedly, protectionist policies such as land rights and tribal councils were 
envisaged mainly for areas where tribals formed a local majority in a given 
territory. For areas in which tribals were a minority, or had successfully 
assimilated themselves with the local population, cultural protection was rarely 
admitted as a goal. Thus, in the case of tribals as well, minority cultural 
protection remained under-supported within the constitutional framework.3  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 While I have focussed here on the challenges to the accommodation of 
multicultural rights, there were also arguments in the Constituent Assembly 
that offered stronger support for such rights that are discussed in detail in 
Debating Difference.  
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New conjunctures, old constraints: Political implications of normative 
limits 
How have integrationist and restricted multicultural approaches to dealing with 
difference fared since the promulgation of the Indian Constitution in 1950? A 
few brief points. The general picture is one of expansion of group-
differentiated rights in several areas. Notably, stronger multicultural policies 
were instituted for Muslims in 1986, when the Indian Parliament passed a law 
that exempted the community from provisions of a common criminal code in 
the area of family law. Quotas in employment and education have expanded 
since the 1990s to include large new groups of mainly intermediate lower 
castes (the so called Other Backward Classes or OBCs). There have been a 
few attempts at the state level and between 2004-14, at the central level, to 
include deprived minorities in particular Muslims in affirmative action 
programmes (Bajpai 2012). For my purposes today, three features are of 
note.  
 
First, even as group-differentiated rights have expanded, the paradigm shift at 
constitution-making from consociationalism to affirmative action, remains 
influential. Its long-term, systemic effects can be observed in the fact that all 
substantial extensions of quotas have been to groups designated as 
‘backward’, and in the shape of group rights claims, where ‘backward’ has 
become the inclusive term to denote a group’s eligibility to special treatment, 
just as ‘minority’ was in the late colonial period. Thus, recent Indian 
government attempts to include Muslims within the ambit of special treatment 
(2004-24) sought to establish their socio-economic deprivation. Advocates of 
reservations for Muslims have invoked values of non-discrimination, 
secularism and equality of opportunity (Bajpai 2011). 
 
Second, the normative deficit of minority cultural protection has remained, and 
been accentuated in some respects. For instance, during the Shah Bano 
debate, policy-makers failed to elaborate substantive equality arguments for 
special treatment in terms, for instance, of non-domination or group 
oppression, as detailed in Debating Difference. Why Muslims ought to have 
greater freedom from state intervention than majority Hindus, whose religious 
laws had been subject to state reform in the 1950s, remained unarticulated. 
During the expansion of educational and employment quotas to include 
intermediate castes, policy-makers did not elaborate reasons in terms of the 
common good, defending these solely in terms of benefits for particular 
sections. How these would contribute to national development for instance, or 
the realisation of an equal or just society for all, was not elaborated. The 
moves to include Muslims within the ambit of affirmative action policies were 
executive- led, unaccompanied by legislative debate that could build a 
broader consensus in their favour.  
 
Third, the growing normative deficit of group-differentiated rights has political 
implications. It has meant that state assistance for particular groups appears 
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as an illegitimate concession, motivated solely by considerations of buying 
electoral support from the group, and, crucially as detracting from the national 
interest or the common good more broadly. The Hindu right, with its rhetoric of 
putting the national interest first, and criticism of minority appeasement - that 
special provisions for minorities are a form of group partiality, with little 
principled basis – has unsurprisingly benefitted.  
Conclusions 
What does Indian experience suggest for comparative discussions of 
multiculturalism? To being with, Indian debates underline the close affinity 
between liberal values of individual rights and equal citizenship on the one 
hand, and nationalist concerns regarding political unity and social cohesion on 
the other. This was neglected in the first generation of scholarship on 
multiculturalism, although it has received attention since. Second, and 
relatedly, Indian debates illustrate the insufficiency of liberalism as a 
framework for comprehending and evaluating multiculturalism. In Indian 
arguments, considerations of national unity and development, communitarian 
conceptions of secularism, and democratic values of equal status and dignity, 
have been significant. A multicultural theory that takes as its starting point the 
experience of Asia and Africa will need to go beyond liberal frames and 
grapple with a range of traditions – religious, socialist, radical democratic- for 
the justification of group rights. 
 
Third, the Indian case highlights the need to distinguish between multicultural 
rights in general, and minority rights in particular. India’s multinational 
federalism that recognizes the claims to self-government of several linguistic 
and tribal groups, is an important example of a multicultural policy that is not a 
group-differentiated right, and has weakened protections for religious and 
other minorities in several cases. The relationship of self-government to the 
protection of minorities is more complex than perhaps indicated by the 
Canadian case, which has been at the centre of theories of multiculturalism. 
Majoritarian multiculturalism in India and elsewhere suggests that in theories 
of multiculturalism, arguments for cultural protection need to be supplemented 
with those for the protection of cultural difference and minority practices.  
 
Fourth, Indian experience suggests that institutional heterogeneity is not per 
se a problem, and can in fact be a source of strength. The Indian constitution 
that embodies two approaches to group-differentiated rights as I have argued 
(integrationist, and weak multicultural) continues to endure as a shared 
framework for the polity, unlike many of its contemporaries. It elicits high 
levels of support from those holding opposed views on multicultural rights. 
Courts, legislatures, civil society organizations and social movements have 
had different strategies to choose from, and have reinterpreted constitutional 
requirements in the light of new circumstances. Contrary to what many post-
colonial theorists have argued, the Indian case suggests that state 
approaches to diversity are not necessarily homogenizing or regimenting, but 
can also lead to greater differentiation of group claims and pluralisation of 
social identities. 
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Fifth, the Indian case suggests that resolutions arrived at, and left unfinished 
at critical junctures endure long after their authors have gone and 
circumstances are altered. The Indian constitution-makers’ failure to elaborate 
a normative framework for restricted multiculturalism derived in part from the 
fears of balkanization and the strength of majoritarian sentiment after 
Partition. Despite the vastly changed circumstances since 1947, including the 
successes of accommodationist policies such as multi-lingual federalism, 
subsequent generations of policy-makers have not been able to elaborate a 
rationale for the protection of minority cultures. The institutional expansion of 
group differentiated rights, without a concomitant elaboration of their rationale 
through public debate, and in terms of their society-wide benefits, has left 
minorities vulnerable to resentment and backlash, as witnessed in the current 
resurgence of the Hindu right. In other words, ideas, norms, and debates 
matter in politics to a far greater extent than political scientists have 
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